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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920388-CA 
v. i 
PATRICK ARCHULETA, i Priority No- 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Patrick Archuleta appeals his conviction for 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) 
(Supp. 1992). The conviction was entered upon a jury verdict in 
the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Sanpete County, 
Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding (R. 136, 141-42). 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The State believes that the issues presented by 
defendant can be resolved most expeditiously under the waiver or 
procedural default principle, as follows: 
Does defendant's failure to request an appropriate 
remedy, at trial, for the prosecutor's alleged failure to timely 
comply with a discovery request, effectively waive his claim, on 
appeal, of a prejudicial discovery violation? This question is 
one of law, decided upon de novo examination of the record. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.6 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal implicates Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The specific portions of that rule at issue here— 
Rules 16 (a), (b), and (g)—are reproduced in defendant's Brief 
of Appellant at 4-5, and will be further set forth, as needed, in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person (R. I).1 At trial, he objected to 
the admission of a videotape that showed him committing the 
offense (T. 157-58). The objection was overruled, and the tape 
was shown to the jury, which returned a guilty verdict (R. 136). 
Pursuant to the verdict, defendant was sentenced to a term of 
zero to five years at the Utah State Prison (R. 141-42). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Offense 
This appeal arises from a disturbance at the Central 
Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison, Utah, involving defendant 
and John Gallegos, both inmates in that facility (R. 1). Much of 
that disturbance was recorded by video camera. The videotape (R. 
*Main record references are designated MR.M The transcript of 
defendant's May 11, 1992 trial is referenced as MT.M The videotape 
includes a visual display of the date and time that will also be 
parenthetically referenced as needed. The displayed times are one 
hour ahead of the actual times, because the video camera was still 
set on daylight savings time when the disturbance was recorded 
(video display 11/9/91 at 4:30 PM). 
2 
152), shows that during the course of the disturbance, defendant 
possessed and brandished a broken, rather sharp-appearing piece 
of broomstick (video display 11/9/91 at 4:40 to 4:53 PM). At 
trial, defendant admitted to possession of the stick (T. 186-92). 
Trial Court Proceedings 
Well before trial, defense counsel filed a request for 
discovery that asked the prosecution to provide to him, among 
other things, a copy of the incriminating videotape (R. 8). 
Defendant and Gallegos also filed their own pro se discovery 
requests (R. 10-16). 
No written prosecution response to the discovery 
requests appears in the record. However, a minute entry reflects 
that the prosecutor acknowledged the requests at the preliminary 
hearing, roughly thirty days after the requests were made, and 
agreed to comply (R. 23). 
Another fifty days later, but still five days before 
trial, a copy of the videotape was provided to defense counsel 
(R. 8; T. 159). An additional copy was provided to defendant and 
Gallegos; however, Gallegos destroyed that tape (T. 159). 
Therefore, while counsel had five days to review the videotape, 
defendant himself may not have viewed it until roughly thirty-six 
hours before trial (T. 158). 
Complaining of the short time provided for his client 
to view the videotape, defense counsel objected to its admission 
as a trial exhibit. Through counsel, defendant also objected to 
the tape's admission because it contained a seven-minute gap (T. 
3 
157-58). The tape recounts that the recording gap was attributed 
to a recorder battery change (video display 11/9/91 at 4:40 PM) . 
Defendant's objection to the videotape was overruled 
(T. 161). Defendant thereafter did not request a continuance or 
recess to allow further preparation to meet this evidence. The 
transcript of defendant's objection to the videotape, and the 
trial court's resolution of the objection (T. 157-62), is copied 
in the Appendix to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has waived his opportunity to complain of the 
alleged discovery violation on appeal. Even assuming that a 
violation did occur, defendant failed to request a continuance in 
6rder to remedy any unfairness such violation may have worked 
upon him. Under well-settled law, this omission operates to deny 
him relief on appeal, and his conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST APPROPRIATE 
MITIGATING RELIEF AT TRIAL, HE HAS WAIVED ANY 
COMPLAINT, ON APPEAL, OF PROSECUTORIAL 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY RULES. 
On appeal, defendant complains that the trial court 
improperly failed Mto exclude the videotape or to take other 
remedial measures," in response to his assertion that the 
prosecutor had violated his discovery obligation (Br. of 
Appellant at 13, 15 (emphasis added)). This complaint can be 
summarily rejected, because defendant, upon the trial court's 
denial of his request to exclude the videotape from evidence, 
failed to request any other remedial measures. 
4 
Even where a violation of prosecutorial discovery 
obligations is established, the defendant is obliged to request 
relief, in the trial court, to mitigate any resulting harm. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.6 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990). Further, the 
defendant must request appropriate alternative relief if his or 
her request for a harsh sanction is denied. A failure to request 
such alternative relief—typically a trial continuance— 
effectively waives any complaint of the discovery violation on 
appeal. See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant's motion to dismiss, because of prosecutor's discovery 
violation, was denied; appellate relief denied where defendant 
did not then renew his continuance request); State v. Griffiths, 
752 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Utah 1988) (defendant's objection to 
admission of his out-of-court statements, not previously 
disclosed by the prosecution, was overruled; failure to request 
alternative relief waived discovery complaint on appeal). 
In this case, defendant objected to admission of the 
videotape into evidence, as permitted under Rule 16(g), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for discovery violations. However, 
Rule 16(g) specifies "other, less harsh remedies," 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 948, for discovery violations. 
Prominent among those remedies is a trial continuance, allowing 
the aggrieved party additional time to deal with the tardily-
produced discovery material. 
5 
Defendant now complains that he and counsel did not 
have adequate time to review the videotape together, and to plan 
a more effective strategy to rebut this powerful evidence at 
trial (Br. of Appellant at 12, 14). However, when his request to 
exclude the videotape altogether was denied, defendant failed to 
request a continuance, or even a trial recess, which would have 
given him additional preparation time. Having solely asked the 
trial court to exclude the videotape, and having not asked for 
any less harsh, alternative remedial measure when that request 
was denied, defendant has waived his opportunity to complain, in 
this Court, of any discovery violation. On this basis alone, his 
conviction should be affirmed. 
While defendant's conviction should be affirmed under 
the waiver or procedural default principle, it may be worth 
noting that the record reveals no explanation for the 
prosecutor's long delay in providing the videotape, in response 
to defendant's discovery request. If no such explanation exists, 
the State's appellate counsel, like this Court, cannot condone 
the prosecutor's tardiness. Cf.. Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 948. 
Even so, that tardiness cannot realistically be said to 
have compromised the defense here. Defense counsel did, after 
all, have five days before trial to review the videotape himself 
(Br. of Appellant at 7). With relative ease, he could have then 
spoken with defendant by telephone to relate his observations, 
and to discuss ways of dealing with the damaging evidence 
recorded on the tape. In fact, defense counsel exploited the 
6 
videotape's seven-minute gap during his closing trial argument, 
impeaching the accuracy of testimonial evidence about the events 
that occurred during the recording interruption (T. 213). 
Further, it is most difficult to discern how, even if 
given generous additional time, defense counsel might have 
persuaded the jury that the broken broomstick possessed by 
defendant was not a dangerous weapon (cj[. Br. of Appellant at 
15). The videotape shows defendant wrapping his hand with some 
type of tape or strip of cloth, possibly fixing the broomstick to 
his hand in this fashion. Then, rather close up, and close to 
the plexiglas barrier between himself and the onlooking guards, 
defendant is seen brandishing the sharp-appearing broomstick 
while complaining about the prison conditions (video display 
11/9/91 at 4:40 to 4:53 PM).2 It would take an extraordinary 
magician, dealing with an unusually gullible audience, to conjure 
up any reasonable doubt that the broomstick, so used, was a 
dangerous weapon. 
In short, defendant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's delayed response to his discovery request. Thus 
2Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-501(2)(c) (Supp. 1992) defines 
"dangerous weapon" as follows: 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of 
its use or intended use is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. In construing whether an item, 
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, 
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, if 
any; and the manner in which the instrument, object or 
thing was used are determinative. 
The jury was instructed under this definition (R. 109). 
7 
even if defendant's discoveiy complaint had not been waived on 
appeal, he would not be entitled to relief, 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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Transcript of Defendant's Objection to Admission of the Videotape 
PAGE 157 
1 II outside the presence of the jury. I'll hear you, counsel. 
2 PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE PROFFER 
3 MR. BLACKHAM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
* Your Honor, the State next intends to offer, as 
5 evidence for the jury to view, portions of a video tape that 
6 u/as produced while this incident was going on. The tape 
7 itself approaches two hours long. The State does not 
8 intend, nor want to show the entire two hours of this 
9
 episode to the jury. We do want to show a portion of the 
io tape, that portion of the tape which would show Mr. 
n Archuleta in possession of this broom stick that's been 
12 described all day. 
13 I think it's relevant for the purpose of it's 
14 showing him being in possession of it, Your Honor, so I want 
15 formally proffer that recording and afford counsel any 
16 opportunity to object to it, if he desires. I'm going to 
17 have the Court view the same, also, Your Honor, before the 
is jury. 
19 THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel? 
20 MR. FRISHCKNECHT: I do, Your Honor. I object to 
21 the tape, in any of its portion, being shown to the jury for 
22 two reasons. The testimony that has been heard, Your Honor, 
23 with regard to a portion of the broom stick in Mr. 
24 Archuleta's hand directed toward Officer Taylor, is for 
25 whatever reason missing from the tape. It's not on the 
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tape. There is about a seven-minute block of the tape that 
is just nonexistent, during which time it u/as supposedly or 
allegedly when the broom handle u/as in Mr. Archuleta's hand, 
directed toward Officer Taylor, and the threatening 
statement made. 
The other ground which I object to showing any 
portion of the tape to the jury, Your Honor, is that the 
defendant was not able to view the tape himself until 
Saturday night at 9:00 o'clock. That has meaning, Your 
Honor, because that affords me from Saturday night until 
Monday morning an unreasonably short period of time in which 
to deal with that and prepare the defense with my client. 
The motion for discovery—Your Honor, I was appointed in 
this case on the 5th day of February and I made a motion for 
discovery which specifically addressed tapes on the 14th day 
of February. I was not able to view it or get it in my 
possession until last week, about Tuesday or Wednesday. 
Primarily because Mr. Archuleta didn't see it till Saturday 
night, that's an unreasonable lack of sufficient amount of 
time in which to prepare the defense, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You saw it last Tuesday, or Wednesday? 
MR. FRISHCKNECHT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Your Honor, the portion of the 



























of the video that there has been testimony u/ith about him 
having the broken broom stick and vyrapping something around 
his hand to stabilize it. It's that portion of the video 
u/hich u/e desire the jury so to see as corrobative of the 
testimony, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now it's my understanding—did I 
understand this, that you told me earlier in Chambers that 
you did make this tape available to Mr. Gallegos,— 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: —but Mr. Gallegos destroyed the tape 
in the machine? 
MR. BLACKHAM: The tape u/as delivered by my office 
to Mr. Frischknecht last Tuesday, Your Honor, for his 
purposes. A copy u/as then made for the inmates to vieu/ here 
in the prison so they could see it themselves, independently 
of u/hat Mr. Frischknecht had access to. So I think the 
State really u/ent above and beyond, Your Honor, u/hat u/e 
needed to do. 
We made another copy so that they could have a 
copy, as u/eil as Mr. Frischknecht have one, himself, to 
vieu/. That u/as provided for them, Your Honor. Investigator 
Evans here advised me, Your Honor, that in that process of 
the inmate's viewing itf while the guard u/as called to 
ansu/er a telephonef that inmate Gallegos hurried and grabbed 
the tape and destroyed that particular copy of it; am I 
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correct, Investigator Evans 
MR. EVANS: That's my understanding, Your Honor, 
yes. 
MR. BLACKHAM: And I don't know hou/ much of the 
tape had been viewed before that, Your Honor, whether 
they—I don't believe they had got through it all. But it 
u/as given them and given an opportunity, and that copy of 
the video tape u/as destroyed by inmate Gal legos. 
MR. FRISHCKNECHT: Well, in response to that, Your 
Honor, my client shouldn't suffer because of Gallegos's 
conduct of breaking the tape up. My client shouldn't be 
prejudiced because of that. But to have, Your Honor, 
roughly 30 plus hours to view the tape, and then have a 
Sunday between then and the trial date, I just don't think 
that's fair, Your Honor. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Well, Your Honor, and I--
MR. FRISHCKNECHT: And let m e ~ 
MR. BLACKHAM: Okay. Go ahead, Paul. 
MR. FRISHCKNECHT: Excuse me. 
I think it prejudices my client, Your Honor. What 
all the testimony primarily has been about is the threats 
that he made with that broom handle in his hand. We don't 
have that on the tape. 
THE COURT: Well, that's something you can argue 
about, isn't it? 
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1 II MR. FRISHCKNECHT: Well, if it comes to that, I 
2
 certainly intend to, Your Honor, but because that fs 
3 primarily u/hat the thrust of the evidence has been and then 
4
 we show a tape that shou/s something else and doesn't even 
5 shou; u/hat this case is all about, I think that prejudices my 
6 client. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
8 Did you have something further? 
9 MR. BLACKHAM: I'm ready, Your Honor. 
io THE COURT: Well the objection is overruled. Why 
11
 he would destroy a tape? That's tough. 
12 MR. BLACKHAM: Your Honor, I u/ould also proffer a 
13 testimony that I u/ould call the officer who u/as operating 
14 the machine, to identify this is the correct tape. And if 
15 you u/ant to hear, maybe u/e ought to hear that, preliminary 
16 to the jury. 
17 THE COURT: I don't think so. Bring the jury 
is back, call the officer and identify and shou/ the tape. 
19 Could you bring the jury back. 
20 MR. BLACKHAM: Your Honor, I don't know. I guess 
2i u/e could su/ing t h i s T V a r o u n d — 
22 [INDICATED MONITOR MOUNTED ON COURTROOM WALL] 
23 — a n d I guess they could see that. I'm a little bit 
24 concerned that In case they've got bad vision, like I do, 
25 t h a t — 
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THE COURT: You can ask them. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: How long is it? It u/as only a couple 
of minutes, u/asn't it? 
MR. BLACKHAM: It will be shorter than that. 
Probably two minutes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
[JURY RETURNED TO COURTROOM] 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY 
THE COURT: The record should indicate the jury 
has returned. 
You can call your next witness, please. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Officer Wayne Larsen. 
THE COURT: Will you raise your right hand and be 
sworn, please. 
(WITNESS SWORN] 
WAYNE LARSEN. called and sworn at the instance of 
plaintiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKHAM: 
1 Q Officer Larsen, please state your name and your 
occupation please. 
A I'm Wayne Larsen, and I'm a correctional 
supervisor for the Department of Corrections. 
2 Q Were you on duty the afternoon of November 9th, 
